Abstracts of Chapters
1. Introduction
The introductory chapter takes note of the recent revival of Bergson’s philosophy after a period of relative
decline as a result of criticisms, often unfair, coming from influential philosophical schools of the last
century. It gives the intention of the book, which is to contribute to Bergson’s revival by providing a
perspective that gives an insight into the originality and strength of his work. This perspective rests on the
central idea that an interpretation that is both renovating and able to counter the criticisms is reached if
we grasp duration as the key to an understanding of being as self-overcoming. The provided perspective
does not adhere to the order of invention by following the sequence of publication of Bergson’s books.
Rather, it demonstrates the centrality of the notion of self-overcoming by using the method of logical
derivation. It thus shows that all Bergson’s basic concepts, such as intuitive knowledge, creation, the
virtual and the actual, the vital élan, the closed and the open society, are all instances of self-overcoming,
and that the famous Bergsonian oppositions (quantity/quality, space/time, matter/memory,
freedom/determinism, etc.) are not contradictory because they are analytic, objectified views on the
indivisible dynamics governing the overstepping of limitations. The proposed new reading gives an idea
of its prospects by providing a detailed summary of the contents of each chapter.
Chapter 2: Intuitive Knowledge via the Inversion of Intelligence
Action and Intuition
Bergsonism and Theories of Knowledge
Epistemological Divergence
Intuitive Knowledge as Ideal Genesis
Inversion and False Problems
Crossing Limitations
Chapter 2 elucidates Bergson’s notion of intuitive knowledge, the reason for dealing with this issue first
being that none of the Bergsonian concepts achieves clarity unless one keeps in mind the existence of two
modes of knowledge. Notably, the Kantian idea of putting time and space at the same level as forms of
representation requires, when it is correctly understood, the distinction between spatialized,
representational time and generative or creative time. While representation and intelligence juxtapose
things in space and moments in spatialized time for the good of practical and social life, in gathering the
spatially distinct moments and things, intuitive knowledge thinks in duration and, in so doing, grasps them
from inside. In other words, it enacts or performs instead of taking external views on things. The
relationship between intelligence and intuition is thus not one of opposition but of complementarity, since
the role of intuition is to reintegrate what the analytic ability of intelligence separates and externally
connects. Clearly, this effort of reintegration of what is dissociated is how intuition incorporates and
overcomes the work of intelligence.
Chapter 3: Duration and Self-Striving
In Search of True Time

Towards a Dynamic Conception of Time
Continuity versus Discontinuity
Duration and Consciousness
Duration as the Stuff of Reality
Duration as Effort
Beyond Free Will and Determinism
Chapter 3 undertakes a thorough study of duration by contrasting the notion with representative
conceptions of time. It shows that when philosophers admit the reality of time, they either reduce
becoming to an appearance or to an unfolding of what is already given, as in the case of dialectics. Since
time, so conceived, does or produces nothing, the need to provide a specific function favored the
subjectification of time. While the reduction of time to representation conveniently agrees with the needs
of practical life, it posits duration as what time must be to be real and hence productive. Time becomes
generative if its moments, instead of dissociating and displaying, fuses into an indistinct and
heterogeneous unity. For a unity to be both indistinct and multiple, it must be actualized as consciousness,
that is, as a content existing in the mode of self-consciousness. In this way, going beyond phenomenology,
Bergson accounts for both the intentionality of consciousness and its ontological dimension. In its practical
function, consciousness is intentionality; as duration, it is being made. With this result, the chapter moves
toward the idea of duration as substance: the prolongation of attributes and states into one another
excludes the recourse to a fixed support, just as it overcomes dualism, since the distinction between
consciousness and matter moves from being substantial to a difference in intensity. Differentiations based
on consideration of tension and relaxation associate the intensification of duration with the gestation of
effort. With effort, we have what is needed to overcome the debate between the defenders of free will
and determinists. Both positions are just different retrospective reconstructions based on the belief that
the action in question is already given. For the proponents of free will, freedom is about choosing between
given alternative courses; for determinists, the choice is illusory because the die is already cast. In thus
refusing to pay attention to the fact that decision takes time, both theories decline the path leading to a
solution, namely, the effort of concentration yielding a creative outcome, as opposed to choosing
between preexisting courses of action or unfolding a predetermined course .
Chapter 4: Life as the Inversion of Materiality
Being and Nothingness
The Negativity of Action
Controversy over Negativity
Negation without Nothingness
The Striving of Self-Limitation
Unity versus Analysis
Transcending Finalism and Mechanism
The Oneness of Life
Enduring Striving in lieu of the Eternal
Chapter 4 deepens the durational unity and distinction between consciousness and materiality, as
encapsulated in the concept of “vital élan.” Since Bergson’s attempt is to go beyond dualism by conceiving
consciousness, life, and materiality as different levels of durational tension, the prime condition for this
stratifying approach is to provide an ontology that is free of negativity. In particular, the dualistic

opposition between matter and consciousness must be set aside and replaced by a conception allowing
the transition from the one to the other. The removal of opposition invalidates the reductionism on which
monistic schools of idealism and materialism are based. To this effect, the chapter reviews Bergson’s
arguments against nothingness and his restriction of negative concepts to practical significance, thereby
laying the ground for an integrative ontology. This is where the question of Bergson’s consistency is raised.
As many critics noted, his understanding of matter as a movement inverse of life introduces negativity
into the center of his ontology. While admitting that Bergson describes the connection between matter
and life in terms of opposition, I argue that one must differentiate the level of analysis from the intuitive
grasp whose defined feature is precisely the overcoming of oppositions. In fusing life and matter, intuition
obtains the vision of an élan, of an inversion recuperating as a striving to surpass itself, to obtain more
from itself than its original endowment. Living beings are various outcomes of this striving, otherwise
called evolution, which then is essentially creative because the necessity of materiality can be
circumvented only through invention. In addition to dismissing both finalism and mechanism, the creative
conception of evolution clearly demarcates Bergsonism from dialectical thinking. On the one hand, the
striving nature of life means that the élan is finite, trapped as it is in its own inversion as necessity, on the
other hand, as a self-overcoming phenomenon, it has no terminus.
Chapter 5: Perception and the Genesis of the Subject
The Contradictions of Representational Theories of Perception
From the Material to the Psychic
Perception: Pure and Concrete
Materiality and the Notion of Image
Bergson and Phenomenology: The Issue of the Subject
The Mechanism of Perception
Limitation and Perception
Chapter 5 addresses the question of perception with the view of understanding the genesis of the subject
through the display of a world reflecting its possible actions. It begins by exposing the source of the
contradictions of classical theories, namely, the conception of perception as a projection of the mental
duplicates formed from the reactions of the brain to the influences of external objects. To this assumption
shared by realists and materialists, idealism responds that the reference to an externally existing world
has no foundation given that the perceiver has access only to what is in the mind. The only way to break
the deadlock is to advance the bold thesis that things are perceived neither in the brain nor in the mind;
instead, they are perceived where they are because they are made perceivable. Since the necessity of
matter is the reason for the non-perceivability of things, a mechanism able to select what is of interest to
the living body while also retarding the actions and reactions connecting the perceiver with the selected
portion would made them perceivable. In other words, the brain is not an organ of representation, but a
delaying and selecting mechanism that inserts indetermination into the material environment and, in so
doing, converts necessity into possible actions. To say that things are perceived where they are is to imply
that they are perceived as they are. However, we do not perceive them as they are, that is, as fleeting and
numberless vibrations, as science describes them. Hence Bergson’s distinction between pure perception
and concrete perception: through the condensing act of memory, the fleeting vision of pure perception is
changed into the concrete perception of stable and colorful objects. The affirmation that things are
perceived where they are seems to suggest a convergence between phenomenology and Bergsonism. In
assessing the convergence, the chapter highlights their crucial difference. Though both reject the theory

of perception as a projection of mental states, with phenomenology, consciousness reveals things thanks
to its intentionality, while to Bergson, things themselves are revealed to the subject, precisely by
appearing as images. Pure perception is the lowest or impersonal level of consciousness; concrete
perception is the level of the subject born out of the durational continuity of memory. In this way, the
fleeting present of the living body is overcome by the being-made or the self.

Chapter 6: Memory and the Being of the Subject
Memory and Action
On the Conservation and Nature of Memory
Deleuze and Bergson
Intentionality and the Continuity of Consciousness
The Actualization of Memory
On the Unity of Mind and Body
Chapter 6 first develops memory’s role in practical life and then tackles the issue of the union of mind and
body. Unlike the appearing and disappearing present of materiality, the present of consciousness has
some thickness because memory prolongs the past into the present. This integration of moments
generates a perpetual tension actualizing consciousness, as opposed to the nonconsciousness of
materiality caused by its evanescent present. The prolongation is also how action benefits from past
experience instead of being an automatic response to external influences. Experience becomes useful if
the relevant information is selected from the past: hence the positive role of forgetting. The latter
operates like a blockage keeping unconscious the irrelevant part, thereby focusing consciousness on
practical life. To speak of what is no more in terms of non-consciousness is to reject the theory of memory
as a weak perception in favor of theory advocating the active creation of memory-images. The rejection
entails the distinction between pure memory and memory-images, with the consequence that pure
memory is not a storage, but an indivisible and indistinct continuity, in short, the thinking and concrete
self. To develop this point further, the chapter confronts Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson’s view in the
direction of “world-memory” and shows that confining consciousness to the psychological level, in
distinction to the ontological status of memory, does not agree with the Bergsonian identification of
consciousness with memory. This identification is also used to contest interpretations proposing a
rapprochement between Bergson and phenomenology. Though some similarities are undeniable, the
huge difference is that the Bergsonian retention is just not intentionality in that it is also an ontological
act, the continuity of the being-made. Given that memory is an imageless continuity, the question of its
actualization as memory-images ushers in the study of the sensori-motor function of the living body.
Memory uses the sensations associated with the nascent actions of motor memory to assume the
appearance of images and inserts into the present of the living body. This image appearance effects the
union of mind and body, which is, therefore, nothing more than synchronization. In proposing an
alternative to parallelism as well as to the assumption of a causal relation, as envisaged by dualism or
materialism, Bergsonism reduces the issue of mind-body relation to the process by which the mind limits
itself so as to be attentive to the life of the body. Nothing could illustrate better the concept of selfovercoming than the mind overflowing the body and limiting itself to upgrade practical life.
Chapter 7: Mysticism or the Overstepping of Nature
Halt versus Stage

Duality of Source and Self-Overcoming
Moral Obligation and Social Conservativism
The Natural Society
Opening the Natural
Overdetermination and Progress
Problems of Modernity
Chapter 7 extends the concept of self-overcoming to moral and social issues and to the question of social
progress, as examined in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The book places the theme of selfovercoming at the center of moral and social issues by conceiving social life as a stoppage carrying the
injunction to overcome it so as to continue the unfinished creative work of life. In this case, overcoming
means the effort to unbind the restrictions and the hierarchical organization that form the basis of the
closed society. As a continuation of the biological work, the closed society is natural to human beings and
is the source of obligations in a setting structured around the distinction between command and
obedience. In addition, the sense of belonging is strengthened by a natural hostility to other groups and
the fear of supernatural powers protective of the social order. This conception of social order as a
stoppage posits another source of morality and religion calling for the continuation of the movement in
the direction of human fraternity and spearheaded by the mystic love of humanity. Because the one
source wants to open what the other source has closed, the temptation is great for a dialectical reading
of this duality of source. However, a crucial factor is missing owing to Bergson’s rejection of a goal-driven
historical process: unlike the notion of stage, stoppage requires a creative deviation, not a linear process.
Consequently, the relationship between the two sources does not translate into the closed progressively
realizing the ideal or mixing with it. Rather, the mystical, while remaining distinct, inspires the creative
effort to translate love, which by nature is limitless and hence beyond legality and obligation, in terms of
rights and duties. The inspirational relation between the ideal and the real, as opposed to the real
progressively realizing the ideal, is due to the fact that the closed society is a natural structure that cannot
be removed. This fact advises a cautious usage of the term “progress.” Not only do the realized
advancements remain fragile, but also disharmony conditions progress because the tendencies of social
life cannot develop at the same time. The need for a successive development of the tendencies explains
social conflicts and imbalances, in particular those affecting modernity. Without rejecting the effort to
correct the problems by reforms, Bergson argues that the reliable solution to counter the excesses of
modern life, notably the frenzied pursuit of material wealth, comfort, and pleasure, is the commitment to
simple life subsequent to a spiritual renovation inspired by the mystic love of God and humanity. This
radical solution is none other than a call for the overcoming of the human, a call that is all the more
pressing as our natural characteristics are ill-equipped to handle the destructive powers that science and
technology have put at our disposal.
8. Conclusion
The concluding chapter gives a succinct view of the results obtained by the proposed interpretation. It
concludes by showing that Bergson’s refusal to endow negative concepts with ontological meanings
inaugurates a joyful vison celebrating the triumphant march of life’s victory over itself, whose end-goal is
none other than the attainment of worthiness to God’s love.

